I think it's an interesting point about how to deal with Peshawar and the Pashtun, though I suspect you're being disingenuous with regard to the rootedness of the radical Islamic worldview in the region. Granted, that is only a suspicion; although it seems we are frequently surprised by that reality in the world.

But the analogy with Iraq is shallow. Some of those we call the "insurgents" are probably fighting for some kind of honor, including tribal honor; but I'd point out that in the Iraqi context, sadly, that tribal honor most often boils down to Sunnis wishing to regain their former hold on power. Which is of course not something we should help them achieve, nor could we at this point.

Beyond that, though, that characterization of the insurgency simply ignores any presence of al Qaida and similar elements; that is, those whose only desire seemingly is to thwart the emergence of stability and some kind of mutually-agreeable (by all parties) power- and wealth-sharing outcome. They don’t want democracy, or rational stability as defined by a non-Islamist perspective, particularly if based on the US having engendered it.

I’d also point out that what you describe as the preferable basic strategy in Pakistan is in fact what our original strategy was in Iraq, and still would be if we could figure out how to thwart the thwarters. For all the talk about actual intent of the war, it seems very clear that the W crew assumed – stupidly – that they could get in and get out quickly, leaving behind a grateful, sharing, rationally-governed people.

In fact, that dumb assumption is what lies behind what most liberals include as a basic criticism of Bush and crew – the carelessness with which the war was started, especially the heedlessness on the insoluble complexity that would inevitably result from the downfall of Hussein and the Baathist regime.

(The obvious response to the view that the W crew wanted to get out quickly is the issue of the seemingly permanent bases still being constructed. My own view on this is that the existence of permanent bases does not necessarily clash with a more-generous view of the war’s intent; I believe the W crew assumed that the Iraqis, having been delivered from evil, would invite us to retain the bases. I believe the W crew and the neo-conservatives believed there was a rational, secular, democratic Iraq just waiting to emerge from under Hussein, and the bases being no problem would be an aspect of that.

(From within that perspective, permanent bases are not a component of monopolizing Iraqi oil, any more than German bases are an aspect of the US somehow sucking that nation’s economy dry.)